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Who is more deserving of protection from discrimination on the job?
Some might argue in favor of African Americans, who were the objects of
the most offensive, legally sanctioned racial oppression of any group in
our country's history. The civil rights movement and resulting legislation
were a reaction to the segregation imposed on African Americans during
the one hundred years after the end of slavery. Others might argue on
behalf of women, who represent half the population but, nevertheless,
receive less than three-quarters the pay of their male counterparts. Women
remain second-class citizens even though they gained the right to vote
decades ago. Still others might advocate for Hispanics or Asians, the
fastest growing segments of the population, who often are discriminated
against because of their race, color, accent, surname, national origin, or all
of the above. In the increasingly multinational, multicultural America, it is
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suggested that these minorities better represent what this country will look
like in the twenty-first century. By sheer number, the forty-five to fifty
million individuals with disabilities are the last of the truly second-class
citizens, others might argue, because of the many deep-seated myths, fears,
prejudices, and stereotypes that persist about them. In terms of both their
group size and their political and economic clout, older workers, whose
numbers grow exponentially with the aging of the baby boomers, are
arguably more "advantaged" and somewhat less deserving. There are also
white men, who view themselves as innocent victims and losers in the
"preference" game and who will soon become the new minority. Finally,
there are religious minorities whose causes can engender passionate zeal
on the part of their advocates.
In a constitutional democracy, the question of who is more deserving
of legal protection is an offensive one. The answer to such a question can
be found in the law and should be plain: each member of the listed groups,
as well as all other Americans, is covered by our workplace civil rights
statutes. The prohibition against race discrimination, though intended to
protect blacks, protects members of every race-black, white, and other.
Men and women are equally protected from sex-based discrimination. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
represent the recognition that prejudice in all manifestations is antithetical
to basic American values. Nonetheless, the question exists because, rather
than the law, it is the politicians, pundits, and even the protected groups
who, by design or default, increasingly seek to define who is more
deserving. Whether because of open hostility legitimized by ideologues,
compassion-fatigue from a calloused public, self-centeredness inherent in
interest-group advocacy, or insufficient resources devoted to it by a less
generous Congress, civil rights law enforcement is becoming more of a
zero-sum game: one group's gain becomes another group's loss.
For over three years, I served as Chairman of the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the federal agency principally
responsible for enforcing laws against workplace discrimination. I began
my service in October 1994, nearly two years into the Clinton
Administration and five weeks before the Congressional elections that
wrested control of the House from the Democratic Party for the first time
in forty years. To say that it was a period of unprecedented challenge and
innovation may not be much of an overstatement. This era certainly
brought into focus once again questions of how American society views
discrimination and civil rights law enforcement; who are "appropriate"
victims; what are "worthy" causes and "acceptable" issues; and how we
enforce the law in a period of limited resources, lowered expectations of
the role of government, and greater militancy by business and politically
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conservative groups.
The politicization of civil rights is nothing new. The very structure
and jurisdiction of the EEOC resulted from political compromise in order
to secure passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. So preposterous was the
notion that discrimination against women should be illegal that the
inclusion of sex as a protected class was part of a cynical and ultimately
unsuccessful political strategy by opponents of the civil rights bill to defeat
the entire bill. Notwithstanding this history, the politicization of the past
three years seems to have taken on new and more dangerous dimensions as
manifested by the so-called Republican Revolution, the Contract with
America, the angry-white-male phenomenon, anti-immigrant hysteria, and
anti-affirmative action legislative initiatives. All contributed to a backlash
against civil rights law enforcement, and all occurred during the three
years that I served as Chairman of the EEOC.
Similarly, the increased fractionalization of the American public
along racial, ethnic, or other interest-group lines made serving as an
ecumenical Chairman very difficult. Advocacy groups exerted constant
pressure to right the wrongs of the previous twelve years of Republican
administrations by prioritizing their constituency's problems over those of
others. As a result, a single week in the life of the Chairman could involve
individual meetings with various civil rights advocates who ignored the
very real fiscal constraints facing the Commission and who nonetheless,
advocated for a greater focus on their respective issues. These groups and
issues could include black federal employees, women in non-traditional
industries, women of color in corporate America, Hispanic women in the
agricultural sector, Asians Americans and corporate glass ceilings,
individuals with physical disabilities competing with those with mental
disabilities, and on and on in virtually every combination. Convincing
each group that the Commission existed to serve everyone was less
difficult than convincing ourselves that we could accomplish this goal.
However, congressional parsimony during the dozen or more years before
I arrived made that noble cause virtually unattainable as a practical matter.
Convincing the American public that civil rights was an "American" issue,
and not exclusively an African-American, Hispanic-American, or AsianAmerican issue, was also made difficult by the political noise generated by
an empowered conservative movement that sought to polarize the
American public with the so-called wedge issues of racial quotas and
preferences.
The debate over deserving groups, worthy causes, and appropriate
issues also involves the perennial question of the Commission's role and
function. The Commission was formed by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race,
color, national origin, sex, and religion. Its founding mandate was to
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receive and investigate charges of employment discrimination and, when
warranted, to attempt to "conciliate" disputes. While alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) is now in greater use, the practice has existed in Title
VII since the statute's inception.
The statute provides that the
Commission, after finding reasonable cause to believe that discrimination
has occurred, must engage in a process of conciliation. Essentially, this
process should involve attempting to resolve the dispute, to end the
offending practice, and to provide relief to the charging party. During its
first seven years, the Commission's only enforcement authority was this
power of persuasion. If conciliation failed, the EEOC had no ability to
enforce its findings through litigation. Although modeled in part after the
National Labor Relations Board, the Commission also lacked that
Agency's cease and desist authority. Therefore, at the time of its creation,
the Commission was an agency designed to "process cases," issue rules
and policy guidance, collect statistics, offer technical assistance, and
obtain justice through the power of persuasion, all without power to
enforce its findings or rules.
It was this view of the EEOC as a conveyor belt that has brought
about, over the years, significant debate about whether its true mission
should be processing cases or identifying and eliminating discrimination.
During the past three years, some members of the current congressional
majority have viewed the Commission as a case-processing agency. This
view would have the Agency focus exclusively on the cases of individual
claimants involving disparate treatment and eschew class and pattern and
practice cases, investigations initiated by individual Commissioners,
known as Commissioner charges, and the use of statistical proof in
appropriate cases, despite long-standing court precedent authorizing such
evidence. This support for an individual-claimant focus was not limited to
members of Congress, though they tended to hold to the more unyielding
view. Some workers' rights advocates also believed that "customer
service" at intake and the investigation and conciliation of individual cases
should take precedence. They pointed out that many of the individual
claimants are without counsel, are unlikely to obtain private counsel, or are
unable or unwilling to engage in lengthy and expensive litigation as part of
a large group. As examples, advocates pointed persuasively to cases of
sexual harassment or religious accommodation where the individual
claimant simply sought an end to the offensive behavior and a return to
work unencumbered by the harassment. The need to "make law" or to
"send a message" was surrendered to the practical needs to earn a living
and avoid a reputation as a troublemaker.
The mission of the EEOC has also revolved around the issue of how
efficiently the Commission performs its work, and this was true during my
term as well. Thus, the concern over a large pending caseload-
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sometimes incorrectly called a backlog'-is also not a new one.
Backlogs-more incoming charges than the Agency is resolving-have
been emblematic of the EEOC. From the outset, there was a great swell of
those wanting access to the rights afforded by Title VII. It had been
forecast originally that the Commission would receive approximately
2,000 charges in its first year. In fact, the Agency received nearly 9,000
complaints. To meet the demand of those filing discrimination complaints,
the EEOC opened field offices throughout the country. By 1971, the
Agency had seven regional and twenty-seven district offices processing
discrimination charges. This growing nationwide access to the Agency
resulted in a significant backlog of charges. To address its burgeoning
workload, the Commission transferred greater authority to the field.
District Directors were allowed to begin conciliation soon after a charge
was filed, rather than having to wait until an investigation determined that
discrimination had actually occurred and that the Commission concurred.
In certain instances, District Directors were given the prerogative to make
the final cause determination, which led to questions of Commission
oversight, quality control, and consistent application of the law. Those
questions continue to be raised today.
Prior to 1972, when the EEOC was granted authority to seek court
enforcement of its findings, the Commission was still able to make a
significant contribution to the early development of Title VII decisional
law. The Agency did so by using amicus briefs in private lawsuits to
influence crucial court decisions defining discrimination and outlining
appropriate relief. Other creative strategies were also employed. During
the term of EEOC Chairman William H. Brown, the Commission obtained
one of its largest back-pay settlements ever. The Commission had
intervened successfully in a Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
proceeding involving AT&T, arguing that a rate increase should not be
given to a company that had discriminatory employment policies.
Approximately fifty million dollars was awarded, primarily to female
employees.
In 1972, Congress granted the EEOC the power to litigate. The
Agency then added five regional litigation centers to its regional and
district offices. From these litigation centers, the Agency brought not only
large class actions challenging entrenched policies but also individual suits
seeking specific relief for an aggrieved party. The Agency defeated
involuntary furloughs for pregnant employees, restrictive recruiting
policies designed to exclude racial minorities, and airline rules limiting
1. "Pending caseload" includes cases filed as recently as yesterday as well as those
filed one year ago. "Backlog"--a pejorative term-should be limited to those cases which
have been pending for a determined period of time (e.g., six months or nine months).
Backlogs are created by more incoming cases than those "outgoing"--i.e., being resolved.

6

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 1:1

flight attendant positions to women. The EEOC was no longer a toothless
tiger, and employers became more willing to settle claims of
discrimination in order to stay out of court.
One might argue that the Commission became the victim of its own
success. Between 1975 and 1977, the number of charges awaiting Agency
action more than doubled from 53,000 to 130,000. In 1978, the
burgeoning workload caused newly appointed Chairwoman Eleanor
Holmes Norton to close the regional offices and litigation centers. Norton
also consolidated enforcement resources in the district offices so that
investigators and litigators could work together more effectively. In
another effort to reduce the backlog, the Commission implemented a new
policy known as the "rapid charge process." This approach encouraged
quick settlement of charges by bringing complainants and employers
together for fact-finding conferences before the initiation of an
investigation.
A 1978 executive branch reorganization added enforcement of the
ADEA and the coordination of federal agency EEO programs to the
Commission's responsibilities.
These additional obligations, though
funded, increased the Agency's workload considerably, thereby
exacerbating an already unmanageable caseload. By 1979, the Agency had
twenty-two district offices with full enforcement units and twenty-seven
smaller area and local offices reporting to them. Also during this time, the
Agency began to actively pursue opportunities to litigate charges of
discrimination. Under its new "Early Litigation Identification" program,
investigators and litigators formally combined to select, at the outset of the
administrative process, charges with the best potential to promote the
Agency's mission through litigation. All of these efforts, buttressed by an
ample budget and a supportive Congress and White House, reduced the
backlog to fewer than 40,000 charges. Success, however, did not come
without criticism.
A General Accounting Office Report issued in 1982 found that the
Agency's rapid charge processing and early settlement procedures resulted
in remedies that understated the gravity of charges with merit and
overinflated the validity of those with little or no merit. In response to the
report, the Commission, under its new Chairman, Clarence Thomas,
moved to an enforcement policy requiring full investigation of all charges.
By 1985, all cases where cause was found, but conciliation failed, were
litigated on a first-come, first-served basis. This approach did not permit
the maximizing of resources through selective, targeted enforcement.
Cases in which investigations revealed a pattern and practice or other
evidence of entrenched or widespread discrimination were no longer given
priority, simply taking their place in line with all other charges.
Consequently, fewer and fewer of these cases were conciliated or litigated.
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Whether by coincidence or as a result of these policy changes, the number
of charges filed with the Agency began to drop. Charges received dipped
quickly from 69,000 in 1986 to 59,411 in 1989. During this time, the
Agency's commitment to civil rights leadership began to be questioned
publicly.
Chairman Thomas's many confrontations with Congress
revealed that the congressional oversight committee was skeptical of his
personal commitment to the Agency's mission, especially due to his earlier
public disavowal of affirmative action. Ironically, the Democraticcontrolled Congress, which should have been predisposed to supporting
the Agency, questioned the Chairman's commitment to the Agency's
mission, his conveyor-belt case processing approach, and his abandonment
of attacks on broad-based discriminatory employment patterns and
practices. As a result, the Agency's funding was relatively flat during the
Thomas years.
The slump in case receipts was reversed in no time with the passage
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Civil Rights Act of
1991. The employment provisions of the ADA became effective in 1992,
expanding once again the Agency's already broad mandate. As a result,
the number of charges filed with the Agency grew rapidly after 1991,
peaking in 1994 when 91,000 charges were filed. In addition, in 1992, a
substantial increase in sexual harassment charges followed the similar
allegations made by Professor Anita Hill during the Senate confirmation
hearing for former EEOC Chairman and Supreme Court nominee Clarence
Thomas. Four years later, sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC
and state and local fair employment practice agencies had increased by 150
percent. The Agency's expanded mandate and a failure by Congress to
provide adequate funding combined to recreate a substantial backlog.
Thus, when I was sworn in as Chairman of the EEOC on October 3,
1994, I walked into an agency with a backlog of nearly 100,000 privatesector cases, compared to 42,000 four years earlier; a litigation docket
composed principally of individual cases with very few class or pattern
and practice cases; gross underfunding for several years resulting in a
smaller, inadequately trained staff and antiquated computer technology; a
dearth of rule-making and policy pronouncements on important issues
under the civil rights statutes enforced by the Commission; and a
Commission which held few public meetings, conducted little outreach,
and was viewed as inaccessible to the public-especially to members of
historically underserved groups, such as national origin and language
minorities.
While some of the contours of these problems could have been
foreseen in decisions made a decade earlier, their magnitude had not been.
For example, because of inadequate funding through much of the 1980s
and early 1990s (with the exception of a one-time appropriation for the
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ADA), the average active caseload of an EEOC investigator had grown to
123 cases when I assumed the Chair. In 1990, by contrast, each
investigator averaged 51 cases. My predecessor, Chairman Evan Kemp,
who resigned in April of 1993, left the Commission with an acting Chair
who justifiably saw his role only as a caretaker pending President
Clinton's selection of a permanent Chairman. As a result, the Commission
did not exercise its responsibility of facilitating voluntary compliance with
the law through the issuance of policy guidance, especially on basic and
important issues under the ADA, such as how to define a disability.
Without such guidance, the Commission could not credibly argue to the
new, more skeptical Congress that it was doing all it could to encourage
voluntary compliance by business, a constituency which the new majority
in Congress believed was already overregulated and overburdened by
government.
Public meetings of the Commission fell to three per year under the
last permanent Chairman. Public access to and interaction with the
Chairman and Commissioners was rare. This was significant to civil rights
organizations that had already begun to question the Commission's
relevance and the Clinton Administration's commitment to civil rights in
light of the delayed naming of an EEOC Chair and the slow filling of other
vacancies on the Commission. It was therefore important to "open" the
Commission to the various communities, particularly to traditionally
underserved groups, such as national origin and language minorities.
The new congressional majority's antigoverment, anti-Washington
sentiment was veiled in some respects by a focus on government
efficiency. The argument, in short, was that Congress supported strong
enforcement of our civil rights laws, but wished to assure American
taxpayers that their money was being spent wisely by efficiently run,
streamlined agencies. On this score, the EEOC was a large target. In
addition to its bulging caseload, the Commission had very serious
operational problems. First, there were the problems with its own work
force. The EEOC's internal labor-management situation, historically
ineffective, was at its worst. The EEOC had no employee appraisal system
because it had been invalidated by a labor arbitrator; there were a large
number of employee grievances pending against the Agency; the Agency
had proportionately more internal EEO complaints filed against it by its
own employees than any other federal government agency; there was no
collective bargaining agreement in effect; and the Agency was the
defendant in several high exposure cases brought by the labor union, the
National Council of EEOC Locals of the American Federation of
Government Employees (AFGE), involving overtime compensation and
other workplace issues. These were hardly hallmarks of a model
employer, much less the agency responsible for overseeing important
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aspects of the American workplace. No agencywide employee training
had been conducted since 1992, the year the ADA's employment
provisions became effective. In terms of technology, the computer system
was antiquated, overburdened, and redundant. Because of years of flat
funding, the Agency could not take advantage of technological advances
that were evident in most government and commercial offices. The few
employees with computers were using equipment so outdated that repair
service for them was no longer available.
On the information
superhighway, the EEOC was "roadkill." These operational problems
were generally not known and would have been potentially embarrassing
to the Clinton Administration, which as part of its National Performance
Review in 1993 pledged to reinvent government. Those reinvention
efforts were well underway at the time I assumed the Chairmanship, and
the second phase, known as REGO II, was about to commence. The
EEOC made little progress on the first phase in 1993 and 1994 as it
awaited the appointment of its new leadership.
If the above problems were not enough, I began the new fiscal year in
October 1994 with a budget shortfall that would have required a twentyfive percent cut from every budget item, excluding personnel and
overhead, because Congress had appropriated eleven million dollars less
than President Clinton had requested. Thus, the Commission was being
squeezed by several competing forces: a smaller and poorly trained staff
with inadequate resources to handle the mushrooming caseload resulting
from the new statutes; higher expectations and greater demands; a more
militant congressional majority, which legitimized attacks on all
government agencies and on civil rights (especially affirmative action);
and an impatient, frustrated, and empowered business community,
provided with little guidance on a complex new statute and with little
appetite for long delays with investigations or the expense of litigation.
In searching for an approach to remedy these seemingly intractable
problems, my first step was to depoliticize, as best one could, the
discussion about and search for solutions. For the first time in the
Agency's thirty-year history, I involved, in unprecedented ways, the other
Commissioners to help find solutions to the Agency's many problems.
Through the use of Commissioner-led task forces, I was able to tap into the
perspectives of the other four members of this bipartisan Commission.
These task forces followed my charge to seek out and consult broadly with
the many stakeholders of the EEOC. As a result, we were able to
accomplish a number of objectives at once. We reinvented government
initiatives; we satisfied our many diverse constituents, who spanned the
political and ideological spectrum, by opening the Commission and
hearing their concerns; we engaged our Republican colleagues on the
Commission; and we came up with a plan that many stakeholders could
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support, thus neutralizing a Congress bent on downsizing government.
Based on the recommendations of these task forces, the Commission
rescinded Agency policies that had been adopted in the 1980s, which
contributed to our administrative bottleneck. The bipartisan Commission
adopted virtually every one of those policies by a unanimous vote. This
helped to neutralize any further political opposition from congressional
oversight committee members on the Republican side of the aisle. I also
reinstituted regular public meetings of the Commission, and devoted
several meetings to hearing from representatives of advocacy and other
interest groups. We implemented new charge-handling procedures that
permit prioritization and better management of incoming and pending
charges, encourage settlement at every stage of the process, and allow for a
greater exchange of information between the parties. We adopted national
and local enforcement plans to guide us in performing our enforcement
responsibilities through the strategic use of our limited resources. Most
significantly, we authorized the unprecedented use of voluntary,
mediation-based alternative dispute resolution to enhance our system of
charge processing and to bring about a more cost-effective, fair, and timely
method of resolving certain employment discrimination disputes. This
marked the first time that a federal law enforcement agency had adopted
alternative dispute resolution as part of its enforcement efforts.
These changes were successful. In fiscal year 1997, the EEOC
resolved a record-breaking 106,000 charges of discrimination, exceeding
the prior year's total by over 20,000. Its pending caseload, which had
reached 112,000 in 1995, had dropped to 64,000 by the time of my
departure. At least when measured by benefits obtained, this reduction in
the number of pending cases did not compromise the rights of claimants.
Since October 1994, the EEOC obtained through settlements,
conciliations, and litigation nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars in
monetary relief for claimants. Most significantly, approximately seventyfive percent of those benefits were obtained absent litigation, without
clogging our already overburdened courts, and without incurring legal
fees. EEOC policy decisions also kept pace with our program changes.
For example, to facilitate compliance with the ADA, the Agency issued
long-sought guidances addressing the definition of "disability," the
differences between disability-related and service-related retirement plans,
and pre-employment disability-related
questions
and medical
examinations. There were policy and enforcement guidances on other
issues as well.
With respect to operational issues, we were so successful in such a
short period of time that we received a "Hammer of Reinvention" award
for our labor-management partnership initiatives. The introduction of
much-needed computer technology, including an EEOC web site and local

1998]

EEOC CHALLENGES

area networks, and the expansion of employee training and development
programs increased staff morale, which contributed to record-breaking
case resolution, policy pronouncements, and litigation successes.
In short, for the first time in years, the Commission is respected for its
enforcement activities, credited for its outreach, applauded for its efforts
encouraging voluntary compliance, and praised for its internal reforms.
The notorious backlog has been virtually eliminated. The Commission's
litigation is more strategic and selective. For example, in the second year
of my term, the Commission filed half the number of lawsuits as in the
previous year, but obtained twice the monetary relief. A delicate balance
was struck: increased outreach, technical assistance, and practical policy
guidance to educate and to encourage voluntary compliance; a streamlined
case management system, including mediation as a method of alternative
dispute resolution; and selective use of litigation. The issue of balance is
significant and historical. There persists within the Commission an
institutional conflict: whether to engage in strong, deterrent law
enforcement through investigation and litigation or to provide technical
assistance and other preventive tools to employers. Moreover, as a
corollary, there is within the Commission lingering skepticism towards
mediation, a feeling that ADR is antithetical to strong enforcement.
It remains my view that an either/or approach is foolish. First, it is
important that the EEOC continue, and if possible increase, its efforts to
encourage voluntary compliance, especially through technical assistance.
The demand from employers is so great that hundreds of employer
representatives were turned away last year from over-subscribed EEOCsponsored technical assistance program seminars. Second, it is equally
important that the EEOC expand its mediation program. Although ADR,
in the form of conciliation, was established at Title VII's passage, it
occurred at the end of an often lengthy and sometimes contentious
investigative process. The mediation program, which we implemented in
1996, commences at the earliest stages of the investigative process, before
positions have irrevocably diverged. Further, it relieves the EEOC's
administrative enforcement system, the courts, and employees and
employers of the burden of a system over which they have minimal
control. Congressional critics of the EEOC strongly assert that ADR can
eliminate the case backlog and should replace litigation. However, ADR is
not a panacea and it will not solve all workplace problems. It will not and
should not replace the Commission's other important enforcement tools,
including, as a last resort, selective and strategic litigation. Nevertheless,
used properly and offered voluntarily, it can resolve a significant number
of the cases filed each year with the Commission.
Revising priorities, procedures, and policies are all important steps in
bringing the Agency's burgeoning workload under control. However,
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none of these measures can overcome the fundamental problem-too few
resources for an increasing number of complaints. Until Congress
provides the EEOC with adequate funding, its investigators will continue
to be responsible for too many cases, and the Agency will continue to
struggle to meet basic needs in the areas of training, technology, and
litigation support, all of which have a negative impact on optimum
enforcement of the law.
Finally, the Agency should continue to stand firm against those who
would force the EEOC to choose its particular pet issues or, as is
increasingly the case, not to pursue certain issues, cases, methods, or
practices. All Americans are protected by the civil rights statutes, and civil
rights is not a "black issue" or a "minority issue" or a "women's issue."
Indeed, it comes as a surprise to many to learn that fifty percent of
individuals who file charges with the EEOC are white. Notwithstanding
this fundamental fact of equitable enforcement, the most disconcerting
development over the past three years has been the willingness of
Congress to seek to influence EEOC enforcement by challenging, among
other things, certain Commission actions, including intervention in certain
high-profile cases; use of Commissioner charges; increased use of class
and pattern-and-practice suits; issuance of policy and enforcement
guidances on, for example, mandatory predispute arbitration agreements
and mental disability under the ADA; large-scale litigation on glass
ceilings or employee downsizing; and challenges
to violations of
longstanding precedents on the use of bona fide occupational qualification
and customer preference to justify gender or national origin discrimination.
Each one of the above issues or activities generated complaints,
correspondence, and calls from legislators who sought in some way to
explain how they supported strong enforcement, but not on issue du jour,
which they argued was never contemplated by the law. Drafts of some
congressional conference committee reports and appropriation language
restricted the types of cases litigated (e.g., class and systemic cases), as
legal services for the poor had been in the 1980s, or the EEOC methods
employed to initiate investigations (e.g., Commissioner charges, which are
provided for by statute). Other EEOC enforcement activities resulted in
editorials, articles, and even letter writing campaigns asking whether the
Commission had overstepped its jurisdiction, lost its institutional mind, or
should be closed to allow the private bar to enforce the civil rights laws.
One newspaper columnist, without a hint of irony, quite seriously
suggested that the EEOC conduct public opinion polls before commencing
certain investigations or lawsuits.
The high stakes business of politics, with so many special interests
heavily invested in the process, seeks to turn the EEOC's pursuit of
remedies for victims of discrimination into a zero-sum game. More and
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more, pundits and politicians disapprove of and scorn the Agency for
doing its job, as evidenced by attempts to ridicule the Commission for
offering employers guidance in the applicability of the ADA to individuals
with mental disabilities, a group clearly covered by the statute; criticizing
the finding that a class of African-American employees at Texaco had
been denied promotions (before the appearance of a secretly recorded tape
of personnel meetings); or the bold attempt of Mitsubishi Motor
Manufacturing Company of America to intimidate the Commission from
pursuing, on a classwide basis, a sexual harassment suit on behalf of
hundreds of its female employees.
If this kind of outside pressure does not eventually force a hierarchy
among equals, a shortage of resources may well compel the Agency to
choose who remains seated at the table of equal opportunity. The framers
of our workplace civil rights laws certainly never intended for the
Commission to engage in rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul-tactics. However, this is
what will result if lawmakers do not prioritize civil rights enforcement and
if funding for the Agency remains stagnant. The EEOC projects that,
without increased funding, its private sector backlog will once again
increase to nearly 100,000 charges in two years.
Employment demographics show that workplace equality for women
and minorities remains illusive. They also show that the profile of who the
Agency will serve is changing dramatically. When founded over thirty
years ago, the EEOC's primary focus was redressing deeply rooted racism
that resulted in widespread workplace discrimination against blacks.
While race continues to be the most frequently cited form of
discrimination by those filing charges with the Commission, racial issues
in America are far more complicated and dynamic than at any time since
1965. The nation's ethnic profile is changing so rapidly that, in the next
few years, it is projected that Hispanics will outnumber African
Americans. Asians are now the country's fastest-growing minority. By
the middle of the next century, virtually half of all Americans will be
black, Hispanic, Asian, and American Indian. For the first time, whites
will be in the minority and a two-tone, black and white America will be a
thing of the past. Our future work force will be composed of more women,
more of what we today term "minorities," more older people, and more
immigrants. Underscoring the new racial complexity are the increasing
number of multiracial Americans. In 1990, there were nearly two million
children under eighteen whom the census classified as of a different race
than one or both of their parents, and many in the growing groups of
multiracial Americans pushed for a distinct category on the census forms.
How do we, in the face of public skepticism and weariness during a
period of financial constraint, continue to promote equal opportunity in
employment for eveiyone protected by the law? How do we recognize and
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protect the rights of emerging minorities, while maintaining the promise
the Agency has long held for African Americans? How do we overcome
the deep-seated myths and prejudices against individuals with disabilities?
These will be among the EEOC's major challenges in the twenty-first
century. Over the past three years, we have put the EEOC house in order
with a balanced and reasoned law enforcement program that combines
prevention, ADR, efficient case management, and strong enforcement.
The ultimate question is whether America's public leaders will commit the
resources necessary to enforce the law and actualize for so many the
promise of equal opportunity, or whether civil rights law enforcement
agencies, such as the EEOC, will be forced to ration justice.

